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ABSTRACT 
The carry trade, where profits can be made in currency markets using price information alone, has been a persistent anomaly in 
financial markets since the collapse of Bretton Woods. The paper investigates the reversal of the carry trade since the Global 
Financial Crisis, aims to contribute towards a better understanding of currency markets, and to understand how the carry trade 
reacts to changes in the short-term policy rate. The results suggest that the carry trade is not a risk-premium, but is driven by 
momentum. The reversal of the carry trade, and changes in reaction to short-term policy rates, are consistent with a change in 
the effectiveness of monetary policy since the Global Financial Crisis, where central banks intervene directly to provide domestic 
liquidity: a liquidity put. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The short-term funding rate in developed economies has 
fallen dramatically since the 1990s (Figure 1): the lowest 
available one month interbank rate fell below 0.5% in 1996; 
below 0.1% in 1999; and negative in 2012.  The Global 
Financial Crisis had been preceded by a small rise in 
interbank rates, with the lowest interbank rate above 0.5% 
at the end of 2006. However, after the Global Financial Crisis 
and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, central banks reduced 
their policy rates and Swiss interbank rates turned negative 
when the Swiss National Bank pegged CHF to the EUR. 
 
Figure 1. Lowest interbank rate among the G5 economies 
since July 1986 
Near zero funding rates are designed to stimulate domestic 
investment and recovery. However, they also fund a wide 
range of carry trade strategies, where investors borrow in 
low interest rate currencies and invest in high interest rate 
currencies. Until the Global Financial Crisis, this carry trade 
earned investors around 2% p.a. with relatively low risk 
(Table 4). This paper investigates how the carry trade has 
changed since the Global Financial Crisis, using simulated 
carry trade strategies. The proposed method offers a 
technique to estimate how each currency contributes to 
international liquidity, and to determine whether policy 
rates have supported the carry trade under the Bagehot 
principle to lend freely on good collateral: a liquidity put 
(Mehrling, 2011, p. 18). 
The proposed method can be extended to include a wider 
range of currencies, including developing economies, and to 
investigate liquidity across different parts of the yield curve. 
As such, it could be a useful tool in the understanding how 
changes in policy rates impact currency markets. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The carry trade has been a persistent anomaly in exchange rate economics.  According to the literature on market efficiency it 
should not be possible to forecast ‘returns with variables like dividend yields and interest rates’ (Fama, 1991, p. 1576). The low 
interest rate currency is supposed to appreciate and the high interest rate currency is supposed to depreciate, but the empirical 
results showed the opposite (Froot & Thaler, 1990). The anomaly has been sufficiently robust that it was described as a ‘pure 
source of alternative beta... (with)... a long-term return over 30 years that is comparable to that of global equities and superior to 
that of global bonds’ (Record PLC, 2009). FTSE, Deutsche Bank, Barclays and others have developed strategies to earn speculative 
profits from the anomaly (FTSE International 2010b; S. Curcuru, Vega, & Hoek, 2010; Melvin & Shand, 2010).  
Currency markets have several anomalies. Exchange rates are 30-300 times more volatile than interest rates (Gourinchas & Tornell, 
2004). Foreign exchange volumes have grown more quickly than GDP, which various scholars have theorised is consistent with 
greater heterogeneity between investors, rather than a convergence towards an efficient market (Frankel & Froot, 1990; Mark & 
Wu, 1998). Fama (1984) suggested that the missing explanation was a risk premium on high interest rate currencies: if investors 
perceive a high interest rate currency to be risky they go short, which leads to currency depreciation and for the high interest rate 
currency to appreciate in the future. Survey data suggests that investors' ex ante expectations are that excess returns cannot be 
earned (Cavaglia, Verschoor, & Wolff, 1994; Frankel & Chinn, 1993; Frankel & Froot, 1987). Rather, the carry trade is an ex post 
phenomenon, which suggests that excess returns are unexpected (Froot & Thaler, 1990; Sarno, Valente, & Leon, 2006). In addition, 
the carry trade is predominantly a short-term effect: there is mixed evidence that the carry trade is weaker when long term interest 
rates are examined ( Chinn, 2006; Mehl & Cappiello, 2009; but also see Bekaert & Xing, 2007). Lastly, the idea of a central bank 
reaction function has been proposed (Chinn & Meredith, 2004).  
 
Sarno and Valente (2006) suggest that the carry trade can be explained by momentum, where market participants regularly jump 
on a bandwagon, altering their choice of fundamentals which they use to predict short term interest rates. Another recent 
approach incorporated a Taylor rule equation, whereby the short term interest rate is a response to the long term rate, the output 
gap and the difference between actual and target inflation rates: this model predicted changes in the spot rate (Molodtsova & 
Papell, 2009) and supported the idea that market participants are herding.  
 
In interest rate economics, Wilson (1994) describes the relationship between short term policy rates, and longer-term rates 
according to three phenomena shift, twist and butterfly: shift explains 80-90% of the variance in interest rate curves and occurs 
when all of the rates move in parallel; twist explains 5-10% of the variance when short and long rates move in opposite directions; 
and butterfly explains 1-2% of the variance when the intermediate rate moves in opposite directions to the short and long term 
rates.  In interest rate economics, the long-term interest rate is not an unbiased estimate of the future prevailing spot rate: there 
is a liquidity premium for long-term investors.  
 
There are three theories that explain this liquidity premium. Liquidity preference theory says that investors are risk-averse, and 
tend to prefer short term maturities. Preferred habitat theory says that investors have different time horizons. Stock-flow 
consistent economics says that the difference between the short term and long term rate is simply a mark-up applied by banks to 
ensure they make a profit after accounting for non-performing loans, deposit interest and expenses (Godley & Lavoie, 2007, p. 
401).  
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In summary, the literature suggests that the carry trade is more pronounced when short-term rates are used ( Chinn, 2006; Mehl 
& Cappiello, 2009; but also see Bekaert & Xing, 2007). In interest rate economics, according to the shift effect, 80-90% of the 
variance in interest rate curves arises because short-term and long-term interest rates move in parallel (Wilson, 1994). 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
i. How has the carry trade been affected by the Global Financial Crisis? 
ii. How does the carry trade respond to changes in the short-term policy rate? 
4. RESEARCH DATA 
Simulated carry trades are calculated using spot rates and interest rates. Three sets of interest rates are used: overnight, BBALIBOR 
one-month interbank, and BBALIBOR one-year interbank. BBALIBOR rates are the price at which private banks lend to each other. 
  
Table 1: Spot Rates 
Currency Description Source Datastream 
JPY Japanese Yen to Sterling spot WM/Reuters JAPAYEN 
USD US Dollar to Sterling spot WM/Reuters USDOLLR 
GBP Sterling to US Dollar spot WM/Reuters UKDOLLR 
CHF Swiss Franc to Sterling spot WM/Reuters SWISSFR 
EUR Euro to Sterling spot WM/Reuters EURSTER 
 
Table 2: Overnight Rates 
Currency Description Source Datastream 
JPY Basic discount rate3 Bank of Japan JPDISCR 
USD US Federal Funds target rate4  FRB of New York FRFEDFD 
GBP UK Bank of England base rate5 Bank of England UKPRATE 
CHF Swiss interbank rate6 Swiss Economic Institute SWIBKTN 
EUR Short-term Euro repo rate7 Bundesbank BDPRATE 
 
  
                                                                
3 The Bank of Japan conducts open market operations at the basic discount rate, such as rediscounting bills or extending loans to financial 
institutions. It is also the Bank of Japan's policy interest rate. 
4 In the United States, the main refinancing rate is the federal funds effective rate, at which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal 
Reserve to other depository institutions overnight. The daily rate is a weighted average of rates on trades through New York brokers. 
5 The Bank of England’s official policy rate. From 1972 - 1981 this was replaced by a minimum lending rate which was set in a weekly tender; 
from 1981 – 1986 the bank began to publish a different dealing rate for loans of different duration (typically one to fourteen days); and after 
2006 the bank also published an official bank rate which is paid on reserves. 
6 There is no official overnight rate for Switzerland that covers the whole period. 
7 Prior to the launch of the Euro, this was the Bundesbank discount rate. 
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Table 3: Interbank Rates 
 Currency Description Source Datastream 
O
ne
-m
on
th
 JPY Japanese interbank one month BBA BBJPY1M 
USD US interbank one month BBA BBUSDIM 
GBP UK interbank one month BBA BBGBP1M 
CHF Swiss interbank one month BBA BBCHF1M 
EUR Europe interbank one month BBA BBEURIM 
12
-m
on
th
  
JPY IBA JPY LIBOR 12 month BBA BBJPY12 
USD IBA USD LIBOR 12 month BBA BBUSD12 
GBP IBA GBP LIBOR 12 month BBA BBGBP12 
CHF IBA CHF LIBOR 12 month BBA BBCHF12 
EUR IBA EUR LIBOR 12 month BBA BBDEM12 
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
To estimate whether the carry trade was affected by the Global Financial Crisis, trades were placed in each of the ten currency 
pairs (CHFUSD, CHFGBP, CHFJPY, CHFEUR, USDGBP, USDJPY, USDEUR, GBPJPY, GBPEUR, JPYEUR) that can be formed from the five 
most highly traded currencies. These calculations were then repeated for each combination of four currencies. Using either one-
year, one-month or overnight rates: the low interest rate currency was borrowed to invest in the high interest rate currency. After 
one month, the trade was settled at the prevailing spot rate. The Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 is taken as the date of 
the Global Financial Crisis. According to Melvin and Taylor ( 2009), this event was marked by incredible levels of currency market 
volatility, with much higher spreads: between Sterling and US Dollars there was a 5500 per cent increase in spread volatility as the 
‘pound sold off dramatically in the fall of 2008’ (Melvin & Taylor, 2009, p. 13). A two-sample t-test was carried out on the excess 
returns pre- and post-Global Financial Crisis, where the one-month excess return is: 
Equation 1: 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 =  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚 + 1) −  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑚𝑚) 
Where s = log of the spot exchange rate between the low and high interest rate currency; ID = interest rate differential between 
high and low interest rate currency; 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 = monthly excess return; 𝛽𝛽= Fama's 𝛽𝛽 coefficient 
In addition, the Information Ratio or annualised Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1994), which is the excess return per unit of risk per year, 
was calculated for each return series. Figure 1, Tables 4 and 5 show the excess returns, Information Ratios and their descriptive 
statistics. Table 6 summaries the results of the two-sample t-tests. 
To determine whether or not there is a central bank reaction function, the difference between the carry trade using overnight 
(policy) rates, and the carry trade using one-month interbank rates, was investigated. Liquidity preference theory says that a 
longer-term interest rate is equivalent to rolling over at the short-term rate, plus a constant liquidity premium: 
Equation 2: 1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = ∏ (1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑)𝑑𝑑=30𝑑𝑑=1 +  𝜋𝜋 
Where 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 is the monthly interest rate (interbank), 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑  is the overnight central bank rate, and π is a constant liquidity premium for 
one-month  
From Equations 1 and 2: 
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Equation 3:         𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 =  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚 + 1) −  𝛽𝛽�∏ �1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ℎ� − ∏ �1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 �𝑑𝑑=30𝑑𝑑=1𝑑𝑑=30𝑑𝑑=1 � − ( 𝜋𝜋ℎ − 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙) 
Where 𝛽𝛽,𝜋𝜋ℎ and 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 are unknown 
With overnight interest rates, the excess return after one month is: 
Equation 4:         𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 =  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚 + 1) −  𝛽𝛽�∏ �1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ℎ� − ∏ �1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 �𝑑𝑑=30𝑑𝑑=1𝑑𝑑=30𝑑𝑑=1 � 
From Equations 3 and 4, using the same currencies to estimate  𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 and  𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑, 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑  and the equation simplifies to: 
Equation 5:  𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 − 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 =  𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ 
Therefore, the impact on liquidity of the Global Financial Crisis, and of changes to the short-term policy rate, can be estimated 
using Equation 5: twist and butterfly effects will show as deviations from zero. These results are shown in Table 7 and Figure 2. 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 shows that, prior to the Global Financial Crisis, all of the carry trade strategies have positive excess returns. The lowest 
mean excess return is 1.935% ±2.275% when the Japanese Yen was excluded: this is consistent with the narrative that Japanese 
Yen was the most popular funding currency (Hattori & Shin, 2009); the highest mean excess return is 2.885% ±2.780% when the 
Euro is excluded. The main result, using five currencies, rejects 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚= 0 at the 95% confidence level but does not reject 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑= 0 and 
𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦= 0 at the 90% confidence level. The Information Ratio is positive in all cases, ranging from 0.305 to 0.465. The negative skew 
is consistent with the narrative that the carry trade goes 'up by the stairs and [comes] down in the elevator’ (Plantin & Shin, 2011, 
p. 5): 
Table 4: Excess Returns Before the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Currencies  Mean8 Information 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skew Kurtosis Jarques-Bera 
USD, GBP, 
EUR, CHF, JPY 
αy 2.305% ±2.435% 0.394 20.246 -1.158 3.498 196.56*** 
αm 2.644% ±2.381% 0.463 19.805 -1.218 6.865 233.06*** 
αd 2.296% ±2.422% 0.395 20.137 -1.269 7.378 285.94*** 
Excluding USD αy 2.358% ±2.631% 0.373 21.879 -1.372 5.223 388.63*** 
αm 2.526% ±2.598% 0.405 21.575 -1.444 5.600 443.29*** 
αd 2.341% ±2.190% 0.373 21.725 -1.439 5.650 448.98** 
Excluding GBP αy 2.246% ±2.738% 0.342 22.770 -0.733 1.628 53.626*** 
αm 2.745% ±2.648% 0.432 22.015 -0.749 2.020 70.589*** 
Αd 2.021% ±2.313% 0.305 22.948 -0.637 2.025 63.908*** 
Excluding JPY Αy 1.935% ±2.275% 0.354 18.914 -0.726 2.142 74.78*** 
αm 2.169% ±2.262% 0.399 18.815 -0.787 2.274 85.459*** 
Αd 1.975% ±1.908% 0.362 18.916 -0.833 2.479 99.639*** 
Excluding EUR Αy 2.465% ±2.806% 0.366 23.328 -1.026 3.000 147.47*** 
αm 2.885% ±2.780% 0.432 23.120 -1.022 3.092 153.46*** 
Αd 2.510% ±2.346% 0.374 23.262 -1.091 3.680 204.36*** 
Excluding CHF Αy 2.520% ±2.842% 0.369 23.635 -1.241 4.052 252.15*** 
αm 2.880% ±2.797% 0.429 23.255 -1.292 4.414 292.14*** 
                                                                
8 Annualised as monthly return x 12, showing a 95% confidence level for αm and 90% confidence interval for αy and αd 
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Αd 2.643% ±2.343% 0.394 23.236 -1.283 4.488 298.44*** 
 
Table 5 shows a reversal in the carry trade since the Global Financial Crisis. Excess losses vary from -1.989% ±3.808% if the US 
Dollar is excluded, to 0.513% ±3.604% if the Swiss Franc is excluded. Information Ratios are largely negative, from -0.277 to 0.081: 
 
Table 5: Excess Returns After the Global Financial Crisis 
Currencies  Mean Information 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skew Kurtosis Jarques-Bera 
USD, GBP, 
EUR, CHF, JPY 
Αy       
αm -0.942% ±3.370% -0.190 17.154 -0.641 0.588 8.453* 
Αd -0.290% ±2.283% -0.072 13.887 -0.354 0.341 2.627 
Excluding USD Αy       
αm -1.989% ±3.808% -0.355 19.387 -0.790 0.100 14.844*** 
Αd -0.470% ±2.918% -0.092 17.752 -0.799 1.363 18.757*** 
Excluding GBP Αy       
αm -1.123% ±3.365% -0.277 17.131 -0.554 2.156 24.97*** 
Αd -0.055% ±2.387% 0.013 14.522 -0.131 0.819 3.145 
Excluding JPY Αy       
αm -0.824% ±3.622% -0.155 18.441 -0.583 0.767 8.274** 
Αd 0.023% ±2.820% 0.005 17.156 0.436 0.878 6.509** 
Excluding EUR Αy       
αm -0.698% ±4.564% -0.104 23.237 -1.078 3.331 66.913*** 
Αd -1.506% ±3.429% -0.250 20.867 -0.976 4.880 117.4*** 
Excluding CHF Αy       
αm -0.080% ±4.961% -0.011 25.258 -0.417 0.112 3.000 
Αd 0.513% ±3.604% 0.081 21.927 -0.345 0.391 2.678 
 
These figures are consistent with the narrative that the Global Financial Crisis represented a major dislocation in currency markets. 
Initially, there were reports that currency trading activity declined sharply, by about 30 per cent, after the Lehman bankruptcy  
(Becker & Clifton, 2007, p. 38). The Global Financial Crisis is described as follows: ‘it is not easy for scholars to appreciate fully the 
magnitude of the dislocations that have occurred in the FX market… fears were met on August 16, 2007: on this date, a major 
unwinding of the carry trade occurred and many currency market investors suffered huge losses’ (Melvin & Taylor, 2009, p. 2). 
Melvin and Taylor identified three stages during the Global Financial Crisis: an initial deleveraging as risk appetites fell and 
investors sought to reduce risk, followed by a second stage where forced sales by prime brokers led to increased risk aversion 
among investors, and lastly a flight to quality as investors bought Treasury Bills and cash. 
Figure 1 shows that other financial crises appear as outliers. The first crisis follows a period of low interest rates in Switzerland 
and Japan until, in August 1990, US Dollar interest rates began to fall sharply. This fall coincides with the introduction of banking 
competition in the US, where investment banks offer retail and commercial loans and there is competitive pressure to reduce the 
mark-up on longer-term loans: the ‘de facto repeal of Glass–Steagall’ (Wolfgang H. Reinicke, 1995, p. 114).  Following the Swedish 
banking crisis of 1992, another outlier, the Great Moderation begins with a period of lower interest rates in the UK, Switzerland 
and Japan, and a further decline in interest rate differentials. The next major outlier is the Japanese banking crisis in 1995, with 
Japanese interbank rates falling below 0.5 per cent. After the Russian banking crisis of 1998, Japanese interbank rates fall further 
to 0.1 per cent by 1999. From March 2006, Japanese rates begin to rise, reaching around one per cent in August 2007 prior to the 
Lehman Brother bankruptcy in September 2008. Since the Global Financial Crisis, both Switzerland and Europe have experimented 
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with negative policy rates, and the Swiss National Bank has pledged to buy "unlimited quantities" of foreign currencies and prevent 
the Swiss Franc from rising further. 
 
Figure 1. Financial Crises as Outliers 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of two sample t-tests comparing 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 and 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  before and after the Global Financial Crisis. When the Swiss 
Franc is excluded, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚and 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  are significantly different at the 10% 
level. When Japanese Yen is excluded, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚and 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 are significantly 
different at the 10% level, but not at the 5% level. In all cases where the Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen are included, there is 
sufficient evidence that  𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 and  𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  are different in the pre- and post-Global Financial Crisis periods at the 10% level, with the 
exception of 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  where Sterling is excluded.  𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 is significantly different at the 5% level in three simulations: for all currencies, 
excluding the US Dollar, and excluding Sterling (p-values = 0.032, 0.018 and 0.030 respectively). 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  is significantly different at the 
5% level where the Euro is excluded (p-values = 0.043): 
Table 6: T-Tests 
Currencies  𝝈𝝈𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝟐𝟐 /𝝈𝝈𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝟐𝟐  T-test (unpaired) 
USD, GBP, 
EUR, CHF, JPY 
𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 0.984 Equal variance: p-value = 0.032* 
𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  1.289 Equal variance: p-value = 0.056 
Excluding USD 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 0.882 Equal variance: p-value = 0.018*  
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𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  1.013 Equal variance: p-value = 0.076 
Excluding GBP 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 1.312 Equal variance: p-value = 0.030* 
𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  1.650* Unequal variance: p-value = 0.135 
Excluding JPY 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 0.929 Equal variance: p-value = 0.089 
𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  0.987 Equal variance: p-value = 0.172 
Excluding EUR 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 0.826 Equal variance: p-value = 0.089 
 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  0.932 Equal variance: p-value = 0.043* 
Excluding CHF 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 0.648** Unequal variance: p-value = 0.140 
𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑  0.811 Equal variance: p-value = 0.187 
 
These results are consistent with momentum in foreign exchange markets. The period prior to the Global Financial Crisis, low 
interest rate economies depreciate and high interest rate economies appreciate: this runs contrary to the literature on market 
efficiency. During financial crises, this effect reverses for short periods (Figure 1), with a persistent reversal since the GFC in 
response to ultra-low rates from central banks (Sarno et al., 2006), as well as direct purchases of assets via Quantitative Easing 
(QE). In contrast with the literature, there is no support for the carry trade being more pronounced when very short term rates 
are used (Chinn, 2006; Mehl & Cappiello, 2009; but also see Bekaert & Xing, 2007): Table 7 shows the opposite, with 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 excess 
returns consistently higher than  𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦  and 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑: 
Table 7: Differences between 𝜶𝜶𝒚𝒚,𝜶𝜶𝒎𝒎 and 𝜶𝜶𝒅𝒅 Before the Global Financial Crisis 
Currencies  Mean IR SD Skewness Kurtosis Jarques-Bera 
USD, GBP, EUR, 
CHF, JPY 
αm- αd 0.009% ±0.552% 0.295 4.090 1.028 12.028 957.26*** 
αy- αd 0.349% ±0.492% 0.007 4.590 1.141 11.560 1550.3*** 
Excluding USD αm- αd 0.018% ± 0.580% 0.130 4.828 1.219 12.842 1907.8*** 
αy- αd 0.017% ±0.565% 0.013 4.697 0.844 13.459 2054.6*** 
Excluding GBP αm- αd 0.724% ±0.804% 0.375 6.680 1.577 10.967 1454.2*** 
αy- αd 0.225% ±0.889% 0.105 7.395 1.974 17.132 3451.7*** 
Excluding JPY αm- αd 0.195% ±0.487% 0.167 4.050 0.810 16.554 3089.2*** 
αy- αd -0.040% ±0.590% -0.028 4.898 0.309 8.701 849.65*** 
Excluding EUR αm- αd 0.375% ±0.643% 0.243 5.348 0.270 7.370 609.8*** 
αy- αd -0.045% ±0.713% -0.027 5.928 0.662 11.036 1379.5*** 
Excluding CHF αm- αd 0.237% ±0.633% 0.156 5.265 0.601 12.614 1792.8*** 
αy- αd -0.123% ±0.643% -0.079 5.351 -0.127 8.891 883.52*** 
 
Regarding the evidence for a central bank reaction function and liquidity premia, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that that  𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ =  0. In most cases for 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚 −  𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑, there is also insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
When Sterling is excluded, the null hypothesis that   𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ =  0 cannot be rejected at the 5% level (𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ = 0.724% ±0.804%), but it can be rejected at the 10% level (𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ = 0.724% ± 0.673%). The Information Ratio for 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ  when 
Sterling is excluded in 0.375. Unlike the carry trade, however, these excess returns show a strong positive skew: going up in the 
escalator and coming down by the stairs.  This central bank reaction function reverses after the Global Financial Crisis: 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ  is 
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negative, as before the null hypothesis that 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ  is zero cannot be rejected, and Information Ratios are negative (data not 
shown). 
The positive skew and Information Ratio imply that speculators could earn fully hedged excess returns prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis by speculating across the yield curve. For example: borrow the low interest rate currency, and lend the high interest rate 
currency, at a longer duration: this is a typical carry trade. Then, hedge this by lending the low interest rate currency at a shorter 
duration, and borrow the high-interest rate currency at a shorter duration.  This result is consistent with banks earning a mark up 
from maturity transformation (Godley & Lavoie, 2007, p. 401), but with different strategies depending on their expectations for 
interest rates. The fully hedged position can be rearranged as: lend the low interest rate currency at a shorter duration, and borrow 
the low interest rate currency at a longer duration, in the expectation that low rates will rise; and borrow the high-interest rate 
currency at a shorter duration, and lend at a shorter duration, in the expectation that high interest rates will fall. This suggests 
that the carry trade prior to the Global Financial Crisis can be explained as a market failure where low rates simulate overseas 
investment, with speculators expecting mean reversion. However, the stimulative effect of low interest rates on overseas 
investment disappears after the Global Financial Crisis: instead, low interest rates and QE stimulate domestic investment. Figure 
2 shows the tendency for 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ  to revert towards zero declines after the Global Financial Crisis: 
 
Figure 2 
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The findings before the Global Financial Crisis are consistent with Wilson (1994): most of the relationship between short-term and 
medium-term interest rates is explained by shift: all parts of the yield curve move together and deviations from zero (which 
represents shift and butterfly) are rare. The findings are consistent with a more effective response of currency markets to the 
central bank (Chinn & Meredith, 2004) since the Global Financial Crisis, with greater volatility and greater deviations from constant  
(zero) liquidity. 
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There is clear evidence that the carry trade between Sterling, US Dollar, Euro, Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen reversed after the 
Global Financial Crisis (Table 6). The most extreme outlier in the period 1986 to October 2008 was the Lehman bankruptcy (Figure 
1), with a strong reversal in the carry trade. This finding is consistent with a behavioural explanation for the carry trade: prior to 
the Global Financial Crisis there was momentum and positive excess returns (𝛼𝛼 > 0), followed by reversal (𝛼𝛼 <  0) after the Global 
Financial Crisis.  
When Sterling is excluded, there is evidence that 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ > 0 at the 10% significance level, but not at the 5% significance level.  
This implies a liquidity put in low interest rate currencies, rather than a risk premium for high interest rate currencies. However, 
the results are sensitive to the currencies included, the duration of the interest rates used, and the source of exchange rates (in 
this case, exchanges rates are to and from Sterling). The results suggest that the carry trade is consistent with banks earning a 
mark-up from maturity transformation, and varying their hedging strategies in the expectation that interest rates are mean-
reverting: that low rates will rise, and high rates will fall. The finding is consistent with preferred habitat theory, where banks 
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switch from overnight to one-month funding depending on their expectations about the future path of policy rates. Whilst this 
mark up increases the potential returns, there is inconclusive evidence for a persistent liquidity premium (𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙 − 𝜋𝜋ℎ > 0).  
The evidence for persistent momentum prior to the GFC are consistent with low interest rates fuelling cross-border speculation: 
expansionary monetary policy was rendered less effective. Since the GFC, expansionary monetary policy, including QE, has led to 
a reversal and an increase in the exchange rate for low interest rate economies.   
There are a number of shortcomings with this paper that need to be addressed. The theoretical framework could be developed 
more fully; the results could be extended to include more currencies, 3-month rates, and long-term rates; the excess return using 
overnight rates could be calculated using daily interest rates, rather than monthly interest rates; spot exchange rates to USD could 
be used; alternative policy rates could be tested, such as an alternative to the Bundesbank prior to the launch of the Euro. 
However, the methodology has the potential to offer new insights into the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
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